

Six Party Talks

Welcome

Dear Ambassadors,

Welcome to BUSUN 2010 and the Six-Party Talks! My name is Jae Wan Ahn and I will serve as your chair. I am a senior at Brown concentrating in International Relations, specializing in Global Security and history and politics of East Asia. Unlike other people you will meet during BUSUN, I still consider myself to be a relative rookie in Model UN. I was a member of the JSA and Student Senate at my high school, but I only started my Model UN career when I came to Brown. So, if there are any rookies, do not feel overwhelmed!

I had a wonderful opportunity to study abroad last spring when I went to Keio University in Tokyo, Japan where I experienced Japanese culture firsthand. Although I am a permanent resident of the United States (with South Korean citizenship), I do know a bit about East Asian languages, culture, and politics; so, do not hesitate to ask me random questions! This invitation extends to questions regarding Brown University and life at Brown.

While the Six-Party Talks Committee first came into being with the primary purpose of resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis, it has become a multi-national forum in which passions often run high and cynical political calculations run cold. Each party has its own agenda, based on historical and political factors. This means that you will have to acquire a thorough understanding of both the modern history of East Asia as and the political goals of each state represented in the talks. We are providing you with the necessary historical and political information of the Korean Peninsula as well as a strategy guide for each country represented in the talks, and you must take these into account when setting your (and your country's) agenda. Keep in mind, however, that these background guides should only serve as a starting point for your research and that it is imperative for you to understand the fine points of the relevant history and political situations of each country participating in the talks.

We have three main issues to discuss during these committee sessions: 1) nuclear weapons in North Korea and East Asia; 2) the sovereignty of North Korea and the resolution of the Korean War; and 3) the eventual reunification of the two Koreas. Understand that some of the issues are designed to have long-term solutions and the committee may not be able to completely resolve or finish the negotiation. Try to find out what your country's stance

is toward these issues, the more specific the better.

The BUSUN weekend will be challenging, but fun! Please come prepared for intense debates, unforeseen crises, and dark political schemes. I look forward to meet everyone very soon!

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Committee Background

Background History: East Asia in Turmoil

While we will be dealing with the North Korean nuclear crisis, a distinctly post-modern phenomenon, it is imperative to maintain at least a basic knowledge of the modern history of Korea and its surrounding countries in order to fully understand the context behind every political decision made and rhetoric used during the talks. I encourage you to read the following summary carefully and, if necessary, conduct your own research into the history as well.

Pre-Modern to Modern Korea: Hermit Kingdom in Trouble (1876 – 1948)

Koreans have always prided themselves in having one of the most advanced civilizations through the ages. Nevertheless, by the mid-nineteenth century the Korean civilization had dwindled into a backward, agrarian country known for its hostile attitude toward anything foreign. While Japan was a relatively developed society in regards to trade and commerce, Korea's Joseon Dynasty, with its unflinching Confucian orthodoxy, condemned any sort of commercial activity as demeaning and unspiritual. This stunted society-wide economic growth and eliminated any possibility of quickly adapting to the increasingly volatile political situations of the nineteenth century. Qing Dynasty's disastrous Opium War against the West proved to the Japanese leaders that they must become a "western" power in order to preserve their independence. In Korea, however, the leaders viewed the War as evidence that having any sort of relations with the West would lead to disastrous downfall and loss of independence. This restrictive view, combined with Confucian orthodoxy, led Korea to keep its doors firmly closed for almost three more decades after Japan opened its doors.

Ironically, the "western" power that finally managed to force open Korea's doors was Japan. This came about as a way for the new Japanese government (which

rose to power after the Meiji Restoration in 1868) to divert the public's attention from scandals and social problems associated with the rapid westernization and to shore up nationalistic sentiment for future colonial expansions. In 1875, Japan sent its British-built naval fleet to Korea under the pretense of surveying coastal waters. After brief skirmishes along the Korean coast, Japan was able to threaten the Korean government into signing an unequal treaty – the Treaty of Ganghwa, signed in 1876 –, opening Korea up for external trade and thus ending its isolation. After just a decade of intensive modernization, Japan had grown into a prospective imperial power ready to enforce its will on lesser powers. This turn of events was all the better for Japan, which viewed the Korean Peninsula as a dagger aimed directly at its throat. The Japanese leadership viewed colonization of Korea, and in extension Manchuria, as a necessity in order to protect the Japanese home islands from western threats.

Nevertheless, Japan soon encountered obstacles in its quest for colonies and buffer zones. Korea had been under the Qing suzerainty¹ since the mid-seventeenth century and the Qing Empire, despite its precipitous decline since the Opium Wars, would not allow Japan to expand its sphere of influence over Korea. Using the ongoing peasant rebellion as an excuse, Japan and the Qing both stationed their troops in Korea without the Korean government's permission. This soon led to open conflict between the two powers, from which Japan emerged victorious. In 1895, Japan and the Qing Empire signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki in which the Qing recognized the complete and total independence of Korea, ultimately ending its suzerainty over the Joseon Dynasty and essentially handing the entire peninsula to the Japanese.

While the war with Qing solidified Japan's position as the only westernized power in East Asia, other colonial powers began to show interest in Korea. The Russian Empire, ever marching onward in search for ice-free ports in the Pacific, began to view Manchuria and Korea as potential colonies or dominions that would be

¹ Suzerain states, while similar to vassals in medieval Europe, retain completely different connotation in East Asia. This essentially meant that Korea accepted Qing's status as the "center of the world," paying tributes and receiving titles. Nonetheless, there was no official Qing presence in any form within the Korean borders and Koreans were free to run their country as they pleased. Moreover, the tributary system actually benefited Korea more than it did Qing, because the Qing court was forced to give gifts that were worth more or at least matched the tributes the Korean government sent. By the nineteenth century, the cash-strapped Qing emperors were practically begging the Korean government to refrain from sending any more tributary envoys.

most suitable to host Russia's expanding Pacific Fleet. Japan, with taciturn support from the British, waged a surprise attack on a Russian stronghold in southern Manchuria and managed to completely annihilate Russia's Pacific Fleet as well as its Baltic Fleet². The Russo-Japanese War proved to the world that Japan was by all means one of the superpowers.

After the Russo-Japanese War, Japan was the sole controller of Korea as well as the southern part of Manchuria. In 1905, then-Prime Minister of Japan, Katsura Taro, signed a secret treaty with then-U.S. Secretary of War William H. Taft regarding the status of Korea and the Philippines. In the so-called Taft-Katsura Agreement, the U.S. recognized the importance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in preventing the Russian expansion into the Pacific, and therefore recognized the Japanese control of Korea as Japan recognized the American colonization of the Philippines. Korea's fate was sealed and Japan formally annexed the entire peninsula into its growing empire in 1910.

The annexation marked the beginning of society-wide resistance to Japanese rule. The harsh way in which the Japanese ruled Korea exacerbated the situation and by the late 1910s popular discontent with Japanese rule was reaching the point of explosion. The watershed came in 1919. At this time, Wilsonian philosophy of national self-determination was rapidly spreading across the colonies around the world and Korea was no exception. In the early days of 1919, 33 eminent Koreans gathered to create a formal declaration of independence and to foment popular uprisings across the entire peninsula. This revolutionary movement came to be known as the March 1st Movement.

The Japanese colonial authorities, however, wielded an iron fist over any and all independence movements; thus, the March 1st Movement ended in failure. Many of the movement's leaders ultimately escaped to Nationalist China, which was hostile to Japan. They founded the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea in Shanghai. Over the years, this semi-governmental organization helped coordinate armed resistance against Japan throughout its colonial rule.

² The British, which signed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902) to stop Russia in the Pacific and controlled the Suez Canal at the time of the war (1904 – 1905), closed the waterway to the Russians, forcing the Baltic Fleet to instead navigate its way around Africa. By the time the Fleet made it to the Pacific its crew's morale was at its lowest and the Japanese naval fleets were ready to fight.

While the Provisional Government was recognized by Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government, another faction of the independence movement formed in Manchuria during the late 1920s. Headed by Kim Il-sung and supported by the Communist Party of China, this group of guerilla resistance fighters sought to spread communist ideology to the Korean Peninsula and liberate it from the Japanese Empire.

As the Japanese government began to turn increasingly militaristic and fascist in the 1930s, it sought to accelerate the industrialization of northern Korea in order to provide for its growing military presence in China. Throughout the 1930s and well into the Second Sino-Japanese War, northern Korea became an industrial base by which the Japanese military were able to continuously expand and wage a total war against the Chinese.

Nevertheless, the situation soon turned worse for Japan as it became mired in a bloody conflict against the United States. Immediately after the U.S. detonated atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Stalin broke the non-aggression pact with Japan. By mid-August 1945, Stalin's Red Army was crossing the Tumen River into Korea, signaling the end of Japanese rule.

Two Koreas: Family Feud (1948 – 1989)

On August 13, 1945, Japan surrendered unconditionally to the Allies and WWII was finally over. Korea came out of the conflict as a defeated nation, mainly because it was part of the Japanese Empire. The northern part was occupied by the Soviet Union while the American military authorities took the southern part. Communist partisans, headed by Kim Il-sung, settled in Pyongyang with the help of the Soviets while the provisional republican government, headed by pro-American Rhee Syngman³, managed to settle in Seoul. The peninsula was divided along the 38th Parallel while Russia and the U.S. argued what form of government would best represent the Korean people. By 1948 it was clear that the division would remain in place and peaceful reunification was impossible. On August 15, 1948 Rhee proclaimed the establishment of the Republic of Korea and on September 9 Kim Il-sung followed suit, founding the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The division became permanent and the Korean War only deepened the ideological conflict between these two states.

³ Many historians argue that Rhee Syngman, despite his long-term career as the "freedom fighter," was nothing more than an opportunist who sought to exploit the U.S. government to further his own position within the provisional government.

As noted earlier, the Japanese authorities focused on industrializing the northern part of Korea while sought to exploit agricultural resources of the southern half. This pattern ultimately created a gap in living standard between North Korea and South Korea. When both sides began to rebuild after the war, the North had a comparative advantage while the South could not even attract the foreign capital necessary to jumpstart industrialization. Indeed, North Korea was the more developed and wealthier of the two until the late 1970s. In the 1960s when the communist economy still operated at an excellent level, North Korea was the wealthiest state in Asia except for Japan. At the same time, South Korean per capita GDP was even lower than that of Ghana. High officials in the U.S. government cynically noted that providing South Korea with financial aid was like throwing away money into the drain – inevitably, the monetary aid would be wasted and no real development would occur.

This began to change after 1961 when a young general by the name of Park Chung-hee staged a coup against the fragile, but democratically elected civilian government. After seizing the political power, Park immediately set about creating a viable national economy in the likes of Japan and the nations of Western Europe. He shifted the South Korean economy away from the primary sector and toward manufacturing and heavy industry. Ultimately he was successful and by the late 1970s South Korea surpassed North Korea in terms of national wealth and military budget. The collapse of Eastern Bloc in the last days of the 1980s only furthered this gap between the South and the North; thus began the North Korean nuclear crisis.

Into the Nuclear Future (1989 – Present)

The nuclear weapon is today's ultimate bargaining tool. By the late 1980s it was clear North Korea was falling behind. Worse yet, the Soviet Union, a major supporter of the regime, was slowly falling apart. With no Soviet Union and no Eastern Bloc, the North Korean economy essentially lost all of its trade partners except for China, which was increasingly turning into an open, capitalist society. In order to survive the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ideological betrayal of China, North Korean leadership turned to nuclear weaponry.

Though both the North Korean and South Korean regimes were contemplating acquiring nuclear capabilities by the 1960s in order to militarily overwhelm one another, these efforts were hindered by the Soviet Union and the United States. Both superpowers were less than willing to provide the Korean regimes the necessary technological

knowledge and uranium to produce nuclear weaponry. The great divergence came in the 1970s when South Korea essentially denounced nuclear capabilities and instead began to utilize nuclear technology for purely civilian purposes, while North Korea continued to use nuclear technology to create weapons. In fact, the series of nuclear crises that have plagued inter-Korean relations since the 1990s are the results of decades of technological research and diplomatic haggling with other nuclear powers such as Pakistan.

At this point a simple comparison would help create a picture of the choices North Korea has made and faces in the near future. Many political analysts argue that North Korea must choose the reformist path in order to survive, much like what the People's Republic of China and Vietnam chose in the 1980s. This, however, is not a viable option for North Korea. In the case of Vietnam, there was no competitor for national legitimacy other than South Vietnam, which it annexed with military force in 1975; in the case of the Chinese "nation," the Republic of China, while much more successful and wealthier than the People's Republic, retains much too small a population and economy to actually act as a competitor for national legitimacy.

In contrast, South Korea is a formidable opponent from the North's perspective – with more than twice the population and at least 15 times higher per capita GDP, South Korea is winning the fight for national legitimacy. If North Korea ever decides to reform and open, there is a chance that the South Koreans will invalidate the North's legitimacy as the representative nation, thus ending the legitimacy dispute and forcing the North to accept the same fate endured by East Germany in 1990. Moreover, South Korea has the backing of the United States, the sole superpower, as well as silent political support of Japan and to a certain extent PRC. Facing this prospect, it is actually quite rational for North Korea to maintain the isolationist policy and attempt to develop nuclear weapon.

Throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s North Korea played a game of chicken with the U.S. and South Korea, increasing the tension to the breaking point. However, the tension decreased after visits by high-ranking government officials and promises of economic aid. The first of this series of political moves came in 1989 when the U.S. detected new nuclear reactors being built in Yongbyon. The crisis began in 1993 when the North, in a defiant move against international pressure to allow UN inspectors to tour its newly built nuclear facilities, threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty. During the intense three-month-long negotiation with the U.S. and South

Korea, North Korea repeatedly made threatening remarks about its military capabilities. For example, a North Korean representative shouting at the South Korean delegates "We will turn Seoul into a sea of fire" is a nationally famous anecdote every South Korean over the age of twenty knows. The delegates, however, were ultimately able to come upon an agreed framework that would have North Korea freeze its plutonium production programs in exchange for fuel oil, economic aid, and modern light-water civilian nuclear power plants constructed by the U.S., South Korea, and Japan.

Unfortunately, the North was not willing to hold up its end of the bargain and by 1998 the situation was back where it was five years ago. The north launched a Taepodong-1 missile, which flew over unaware Japan, and created mass panic. At this point, Japan became openly hostile to North Korea.

The situation only worsened (at least from the U.S. perspective) as George W. Bush and his neo-conservative advisors came into power in 2000. In 2002, Bush made the famous speech in which he branded North Korea part of the axis of evil along with Iraq and Iran. After much prodding and questioning by the State Department, the North released a statement that allegedly admitted it had been secretly running the nuclear program. After much confusion and misinterpretation, the north began asserting the U.S. government deliberately misinterpreted the Korean phrase "entitled to possess" to "admitting to possess" nuclear weapons.

While the U.S.-North Korean relations rapidly deteriorated in the 2000s, inter-Korean relations improved. This was mostly due to the left-centrist administration coming to power in South Korea. While acknowledging that the North's response to the agreed framework in 1994 was less than satisfactory, Kim Dae-jung, South Korea's new reformist president, argued that the improving diplomatic and political relations with North Korea was a vital step toward eliminating threats of the Second Korean War and create a favorable environment for peaceful reunification. In June 15, 2000, Kim Dae-jung stepped off his charter plane into a roaring crowd of North Koreans welcoming him. This was the first time since the Korean War that the executive of the Republic of Korea made a state visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il, who had taken over as the supreme leader since his father's death in 1994, agreed on reconciliation and economic cooperation. This was the beginning of what was to be known as the "Sunshine Policy," in which South Korea would provide economic aid and political support in the international arena to North

Korea and would reciprocate by easing the tensions between the two sides and decreasing the military buildup along the DMZ. Ultimately, Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy was a half success, since the North never effectively began disarming its troops along the DMZ nor did it fully abandon its nuclear program. In fact, many political analysts both in South Korea and the U.S. argue that the Sunshine Policy never fully worked because of the U.S. government's openly hostile attitude toward Pyongyang.

It is a well-known fact that North Korea has been seeking the U.S.'s guarantee that the coalition force of the U.S. and South Korea will not invade North Korea and topple the regime in order to reunify the peninsula. In order to acquire the U.S.'s guarantee the North viewed the nuclear program as an essential bargaining chip, which it would and must never relinquish. Meanwhile, the U.S. government led by Bush refused to view the bigger picture from the North Korean perspective and sought only to eliminate the possibility of nuclear North Korea with no diplomatic promises. Due to the irreconcilable differences in perspectives, the situation stagnated and the Sunshine Policy was rendered less than effective.

Just as when the tension between the U.S. and North Korea was about to reach its breaking point, the North conceded by stating that it was willing to hold talks in order to resolve the nuclear program deadlock; thus began the Six-Party Talks, which sought to ease the tensions among the member states and ultimately create a denuclearized Korean Peninsula with real possibility for peace and stable diplomatic relations. Nevertheless, the representatives to the talks were not able to achieve any of the desired results and the North was able to finally acquire nuclear weapons in October 2006.

Committee Format and Rules of Debate

Committee sessions will generally proceed in informal debate (or "moderated caucus"), with speaking times proposed either by the Chair or by individual members. As a general rule, members are discouraged from talking amongst themselves while others are speaking, and should instead write notes to one another or motion for an unmoderated caucus. The Chair reserves the right to interrupt debate to introduce news or guest speakers.

As they are unwieldy for such a small committee and too time-intensive for use during a crisis, proposals made in official UN Resolution format will be discouraged. Instead, members are encouraged to make use of different forms that are more appropriate for this committee: press releases (for public communications) and diplomatic notes (for

classified communications with other ambassadors) may all be used. All proposals must first be submitted to the Chair in written form. After reviewing the proposal, the Chair will then call upon the author to present the proposal to the committee.

Resolutions of the Six-Party Talks are made by consensus after thorough negotiations, so members are encouraged to develop proposals that the entire body (and not simply one group of nations) can agree to and support as the collective goal. Should the Chair determine that there are intractable disagreements over a proposal, it shall be the Chair's prerogative either to advise members to disregard the proposal entirely or call the proposal to a majority-rules vote.

Each member of this committee is accountable for policies of his/her nation and therefore must act strictly within the boundaries of "rational preferences." For example, if you are the North Korean representative you may not vote in favor of a resolution that would invalidate the North Korean sovereignty and force the North to surrender its political independence. On the other hand you may want to vote in favor of a resolution that officially acknowledges and allows for the existence of two separate governments in the Korean Peninsula – predictably, this resolution will not be acceptable to the South Korean representatives. If members do decide to deviate from "rational preferences" of their nations they must first explain the rationale to the Chair.

Research Resources

In addition to the resources provided in the following guide, be sure to keep an eye on major international news sources. This will help you understand your country's concerns and interests. Some of the news sources include the BBC, New York Times, Washington Post, People's Daily (PRC), Asahi Shimbun (Japan), and Korea Times. Feel free to supplement your media resources with information from blogs – but be sure to check the accuracy of their reports.

If you need any assistance during the research process, please do not hesitate to email the Chair.

The agenda for this meeting of the Six-Nation Talks will mainly focus on three major topics:

Topic 1: Nuclear Proliferation in East Asia

East Asia had been a comparatively stable region until the end of the Cold War. To be sure, the Korean War was an intense war and it actually did have a potential to

become a global war of ideological rivalry.⁴ Nonetheless, by the end of the war, the geopolitical balance of power was achieved and (albeit uneasy) stability returned to the region. While PRC did manage to develop its own nuclear weaponry in 1964, it was too embroiled in domestic turmoil – the Cultural Revolution, for example – for much of the Cold War to pose as a concrete threat to the regional balance. Moreover, the Soviet Union was never able to assert too much influence over the Chinese politics, which meant Moscow could never use China as a nuclear launch pad directed at the U.S. or its East Asian allies.

The end of the Cold War ushered in a period of uncertainty in East Asia. While the U.S. was stronger than ever, its interest in East Asia was slowly waning, leaving Japan and Taiwan to fend for themselves from growing (perceived) military threats from PRC. The U.S. has never been a reliable ally for South Korea and the end of the Cold War was a perfect chance for its government to reassert its sovereign rights to control military operations. PRC, with its growing economic influence, is seeking to assert its newfound superpower status in the region; China has begun to invest in blue water navy and has started to upgrade its ground forces technologically. Thus, the balance of power is breaking down. Much as the United Kingdom was not able to participate in the growing military arms race (involving naval fleets) in Europe before WWI, the U.S. no longer has the capacity to control the political and military ambitions of its allies in East Asia.

In fact, North Korea is not the only East Asia state with overtly nationalistic nuclear ambitions. In recent public surveys the majority of South Koreans (close to 90 percent) and Japanese (60 percent) answered that acquiring nuclear weaponry was a viable way to guarantee national security and assert national power in East Asia. Undoubtedly the North Korean acquisition of the nuclear weaponry has exacerbated this societal trend.

Therefore, resolving the nuclear crisis and denuclearizing North Korea through the Six-Party Talks is not just a one-state issue, but a regional issue as well. By disarming North Korea the delegates have the possibility of stabilizing East Asia and creating a new balance of power.

⁴ When the Chinese began aiding the North Koreans against the UN-backed South Korea in the winter of 1951, General Douglas MacArthur, the then-commander of the UN coalition forces, proposed to President Truman that in order to secure victory in Korea the U.S. must deploy nuclear weapons in Manchuria and China in extension. Horrified at the prospect of WWII, Truman sacked MacArthur and instead opted for armistice with the North Koreans.

Questions To Consider

1. With the Cold War balance of power rapidly shifting, what are the options for each of the parties involved in the talks to guarantee their national security?
2. Many have pointed out that acquiring a nuclear arsenal is one of sovereign nation's rights and that the U.S. and China, with both states retaining a sizable stockpile of nuclear weapons and ingredients to create nuclear bombs, do not have rights to intervene. What are your views on this issue?
3. According to the 1994 Agreed Framework, the U.S., South Korea, and Japan are to provide North Korea with a nuclear power plant for civilian usage in return for the North's abandoning its nuclear program. Both sides had defaulted on their promises by 2002, but the North still brings the issue to the table. Should the nuclear light-water reactor be used as a bargaining chip? Do the benefits of building a nuclear reactor outweigh the risk of North Korea defaulting on its promises once again?

Helpful Resources

GlobalSecurity.org

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/>

The 1994 Agreed Framework between North Korea and the U.S.

<http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/book/af.html>

Full-text of Six-nation statement on North Korea, released after the fourth round of the six-party talks, 2005

<http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/sr/2005/0577Agreement.html#sect2>

"Korean Crisis Is Different This Time," a 2009 article from New York Times published after the North Korean second nuclear test

<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/04/world/asia/04iht-letter.html?pagewanted=1&ref=asia>

The North Korean issue interactive chart, published by New York Times, 2009

<http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/04/05/world/asia/20090405-korea-timeline.html>

Topic 2: Sovereignty of North Korea and Resolution of the Korean War

According to the South Korean Constitution, the Republic of Korea retains jurisdiction over the entire Korean Peninsula. This essentially means that (a) South Korea considers North Korea to be a breakaway regime

that should not exist in reality and (b) it can never guarantee the political stability of the North Korean regime. The U.S., the primary ally of South Korea, has never supported North Korea's sovereign right to exist.

Moreover, the Korean War has never officially ended. In 1953, the U.S. and North Korea signed an armistice, not a treaty to end the war. Technically, the two Koreas are going through a break period to resume warfare in the unknown future. Even though North Korea has held numerous talks and summits with both the U.S. and South Korea, it has never been able to affirmatively end the war. North Korea views this as a primary threat to its sovereignty and evidence that South Korea has not abandoned its plans to militarily defeat the North and absorb its territory.

Questions To Consider

1. Is it necessary to view the nuclear program issue and the sovereignty issue as two different sides of the same coin? In other words, would your nation view the two issues as separate or indistinguishable?
2. What about human rights issues? Is it practical or desirable to bring up human rights issues in North Korea (which the North would view as a violation of its sovereign rights) to the forefront of the negotiations for your nation? Why or why not?

Topic 3: Reunification of the Korean Peninsula and the Peace Process in East Asia

Even if this session of the Six-Party Talks manages to successfully denuclearize North Korea, there is still the issue of reunification. Indeed, reunification of the two Koreas is a political scenario that has the potential to act as a destabilizing or stabilizing force in the East Asian region.

Understandably, it is more than possible that the committee will be deadlocked on the issue of reunification. The goal is to create a unified approach toward the issue and eventually build a roadmap that will guide each nation through the process of reunification.

Questions To Consider

1. Would Korean reunification ultimately help your nation? Will it strengthen or weaken your nation's position in East Asia? What do you think your nation's stance on the reunification should be?
2. From a purely geopolitical perspective, the states

involved in the talks are divided into two factions – the Continentals and the Marines. The Continentals, composed of China, North Korea, and Russia to a lesser extent, tend to view the U.S. as an opponent rather than a cooperative force. The Marines, led by the U.S. and composed of Japan and South Korea, enjoy much more cooperative relations with each other. Does your nation benefit from the factional politics? What are the ways to overcome the divides between these two groups and achieve a consensus?

Helpful Resources

"Korea's slow-motion reunification," a 2005 Boston Globe article on the issue of Korean reunification

http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2005/06/09/koreas_slow_motion_reunification/

"Despite U.S. Attempts, N. Korea Anything but Isolated," a 2005 Washington Post article on the issue of inter-Korean economic cooperation

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/11/AR2005051100527.html>