

Security Council of the Russian Federation

Welcome

Dear members of the Security Council of the Russian Federation,

Hi, I'm Omar Lansari and I will Chair the Security Council of the Russian Federation. I am a graduate student in Molecular Biology and a diehard fan of Model UN. I grew up in Montreal (oui, je parle en français) and I have a long history of political involvement on campuses in both Montreal and here at Brown. Feel free to ask me any questions at all: RFSC@busun.net

We are a crisis committee, so prepare for the worst, and keep a very Russian view on all fronts. I'd like to request position papers that focus on steps our federation could take, in order to remain influential in the Balkans and on matters of trade with the EU. If we must make our intentions clear, as we have in the past by shutting off gas lines and invading aggressive neighbors then so be it. We must do our best so make clear to all our neighbors that EU positions are untenable and ineffective. Each of you will hold a certain title, and I'd like to hear a specific take on how our policy should proceed based in the position held. Let military officials be soldiers, and let politicians be diplomatic.

We are at a defining moment in Russian politics. The United States has become increasingly involved in the Balkans, making promises to all sides in efforts to earn trust. They support the fragmentation of our regional allies to dilute our influence and encourage the aspirations of many minorities within and just beyond our borders. Our military partnership and installations in many of our allies' territories may come under direct threat, while the political entities that are propped up by the US are thrown into the spotlight under a sympathetic light. Many delude themselves into believing that we are passive when it comes to defending our land, and fail to see that our effective use of military and economic force has been demonstrated many times in the past decades. We must re-established firm links with our neighbors, strengthen potential allies, reach out to new sectors of the population, expose American and EU interests under guise of 'democratization', and extinguish all threats before they mushroom and become more pressing concerns.

You are a key member of our council, and although you do not wield executive powers (within this council), you have the ear of the President at a crucial time. This council is a mélange of selected politicians, military officials, intelligence agents and diplomats. I urge you to come up with comprehensive approaches to problem solving as issues come our way, and I urge you to conciliate and fuse

opposing positions of the ministries of defense and foreign affairs in all matters. You have the authority to plan decisions for the, the President, on military policy, protection of civil rights, internal and external security, and foreign policy issues, and you also have the power to conduct basic research, long-range planning, and coordination of other executive-branch efforts in the foreign policy realm.

Good luck and I look forward to seeing you in November.

Sincerely

Omar Lansari
Security Council of the Russian Federation Chair
RFSC@busun.net

Background on the Russian Security Council

The Security Council of the Russian Federation is an advisory body to the president on matters pertaining to national security. The council assists in analysis and development of strategic approaches to security issues by preparing intelligence documents and assisting with the drafting of presidential decisions. It deals with a wide-ranging number of concerns, including foreign and domestic security, military policy, and foreign policy. By law the council is required to meet at least once a month. The Security Council is based upon the Defense Council established during the Krushchev era, which Yeltsin replaced with the Security Council in 1992. Yeltsin claimed the newly constituted consultative body would be transparent, modeled after the UN Security Council. However, it quickly lost power to other executive branch advisors until 1996, when former general Lebedev was appointed secretary and a presidential decree broadened the scope of the council's mission. In 1999, current President Putin served as Secretary of the Security Council.

The Security Council for our simulation will have the following structure:

Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation
Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Security Council
Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister
Viktor Zubkov, First Deputy Prime Minister
Igor Shuvalov, First Deputy Prime Minister
Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Anatoly Serdyukov, Minister of Defense
Mikhail Fradkov, Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service
Alexander Bortnikov, Director of the Federal Security Service

Boris Gryzlov, Chairman of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly
 Sergey Mironov, Chairman of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly
 Rashid Nurgaliyev, Minister of Internal Affairs
 Sergey Naryshkin, Head of the Administration of the President

The council also includes inter-agency commissions for special topics and a Scholarly Council. However, for the purpose of our simulation we will be including only the permanent members.

Committee Format and Rules of Debate:

Generally speaking, committee will be conducted in informal debate, similar to moderated caucus in normal Model UN debate. Speaking times will be proposed either by the Chairman or by the members. The Chairman reserves the right to suspend the debate should such a situation arise as the entrance of a guest speaker, the arrival of a message, or the need of members to discuss issues in a more informal setting or write decisions.

Rather than UN style resolution writing, the Security Council will rely on a few forms of decisions. Firstly, the Council has the power under Russian law to draft two types of decisions: presidential decisions and presidential edicts. Though the two are very similar, decisions only create defined presidential policy, while edicts have legal standing. Both of these types of documents must be approved and signed by the President of the Russian Federation in order to come into effect. Secondly, like the other Joint Crisis Committees, the SCRF may release press releases to state or private media outlets, communiqués to other bodies of the government of the Russian Federation, diplomatic communiqués to other states.

Decisions of the Security Council are, as per its founding document, made by a vote of the ten permanent members. Voting is done on a majority basis, but, as the body is only consultative, the President of the Russian Federation will have the right to make the final decision on whether or not to act on the recommendations of the Council. That being stated, all decisions of the Council will be enacted except in the case of extenuating circumstances. The members of the Security Council should look to act only within the restrictions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, but should at all times act in the interest of the Russian society and the state to safeguard the security of the Russian Federation. Though the some of the members of the Council have charge over various executive bodies, they should not make decisions on behalf of these bodies unilaterally, but rather bring their proposal

before the President in a note so that the proposal can be properly addressed. Please keep in mind that, while a democracy, Russia has a very centralized power structure emanating from the President, so any attempt to act too far against the President's interest is generally seen as a poor decision for one's own career.

Relations with the West

Background

Russia's relations with the West are, at their very core, tied to the legacy of the Cold War. For about half a century, the Soviet Union was almost universally recognized as one of two superpowers in the world, at more or less equal standing with the United States. The fall of the Soviet Union meant that Russia would be forced to chose how it would position itself in the new world order – with the West or against it.

In the early days of the Yeltsin administration, Russian relations with the West were on a whole quite friendly. With a government wary of the Cold War and outwardly defining itself as against the concepts of Soviet Rule, the SCRF put forward a policy paper in 1993, entitled “Russian Military Doctrine”, which stated inter alia that Russia:

- *is committed to the principles of the peaceful settlement of international disputes, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, noninterference in their internal affairs, inviolability of state borders and other universally recognized principles of international law;*
- *regards no state as its enemy;*
- *will not employ its Armed Forces or other troops against any state other than for individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack is made on the Russian Federation, its citizens, territory, Armed Forces, other troops, or its allies.*

Furthermore, while listing threats against the Russian Federation, it did not mention the West, except through implicit references via nuclear proliferation and foreign soldiers within the boundaries of neighboring states. This document also affirmed Russia's commitment to international organizations, international law, and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. This non-confrontational position was taken for two reasons. Firstly, Russia's rapidly transitioning economy required Western investment, which certainly could not be provided if Russia was still thought to see the NATO bloc as its enemies. Secondly, President Yeltsin was engaged in a power struggle from inside, attempting to solidify his position against Communists and Nationalists, and thus required foreign

support at the cost of Russia's stature in the international community.

Beginning in 1996, Russian policy towards the West began to depart from its earlier position of integration and cooperation to one that gave more weight to Russian state interests. This new worldview saw a multipolar system in which Russia, the U.S., and other powerful states would all be recognized as powerful states. With the resignation of Boris Yeltsin in 2000 and the accession of Vladimir Putin to the presidency, this policy was further solidified, leading to a clear break with the prior policy of integration with the West.

The View of the Putin Administration towards the West

The Putin administration's view towards Russian foreign policy build further on the previous concept of a multipolar world, but rather than one in which all powers worked together through international organs, this concept implied the division of the world into spheres of influence in that particular power would dominate over regional relations. For Russia, this broadly meant an expansion of influence in the "near abroad" or former Soviet states, as well as an increasing role in eastern Asia and Middle East. One defining document of this period was the "Russian National Security Concept", published in 2000. Unlike the "Russian Military Doctrine", this document takes a more argumentative tone, and specifically discusses the role of the United States and the West as a whole in decreasing Russian clout in the international community.

The situation in the world is characterized by a dynamic transformation of the system of international relations. Following the end of the bipolar confrontation era, two mutually-exclusive trends took shape.

The first of these trends shows itself in the strengthened economic and political positions of a significant number of states and their integrative associations and in improved mechanisms for multilateral management of international processes. Economic, political, science and technological, environmental and information factors are playing an ever-increasing role. Russia will facilitate the formation of an ideology of establishing a multipolar world on this basis.

The second trend shows itself in attempts to create an international relations structure based on domination by developed Western countries in the international community, under US leadership and designed for unilateral solutions (including the use of military force) to key issues in world politics in circumvention of the fundamental rules of international law.

The formation of international relations is accompanied by competition and also by the aspiration of a number of states to strengthen their influence on global politics, including by creating weapons of mass destruction. Military force and violence remain substantial aspects of international relations.

Russia is one of the world's major countries, with centuries of history and rich cultural traditions. Despite the complex international situation and its own temporary difficulties, Russia continues to play an important role in global processes by virtue of its great economic, scientific, technological and military potential and its unique strategic location on the Eurasian continent.

[...]

At the same time, a number of states are stepping up efforts to weaken Russia politically, economically, militarily and in other ways. Attempts to ignore Russia's interests when solving major issues of international relations, including conflict situations, are capable of undermining international security, stability, and the positive changes achieved in international relations.

This document also is much more deliberate in defining threats than its predecessor, specifically enumerating grievances against Western states. Threats under this document include:

- *the desire of some states and international associations to diminish the role of existing mechanisms for ensuring international security, above all the United Nations and the OSCE; the danger of a weakening of Russia's political, economic and military influence in the world;*
- *the strengthening of military-political blocs and alliances, above all NATO's eastward expansion;*
- *the possible emergence of foreign military bases and major military presences in the immediate proximity of Russian borders;*
- *proliferation of mass destruction weapons and their delivery vehicles;*
- *the weakening of integrational processes in the Commonwealth of Independent States;*
- *outbreak and escalation of conflicts near the state border of the Russian Federation and the external borders of CIS member states;*
- *territorial claims on Russia.*

It should be noted that this document was created under a very different political climate. The year 2000 was more or less the height of American power in the world, following U.S. and NATO involvement in Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Russia, feeling its interests threatened, felt that it

had to begin to exert its influence internationally in order to preserve its status in its sphere. Additionally, Russia had based its post-Soviet foreign policy on the supremacy of international organizations and international law in protecting world order. Under this concept, all issues of international peacekeeping would be cleared through the UN Security Council, and thus would require Russian approval. Russia would be able to defend its interests in accordance with international law. However, with the United States finding itself in an unprecedented position of strength, both in terms of hard and soft power, it was willing to go against international organizations in order to secure its interests. As a result, Russia began to look to increase its own power outside of international law. It began to take a softer position on nuclear nonproliferation and to export its influence in the “near abroad”.

One of the greatest threats to Russian influence in the region – and one of the ones that has created the greatest tension – is the increasing grasp of the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the “near abroad”. The integration of the Baltic states into the EU, as well as NATO, has pushed the boundaries of the West into the realm of the former Soviet Union the promise that of entry to NATO to Georgia and Ukraine means that NATO will now expand into the Commonwealth of Independent States. Russia’s response has been largely to strengthen the Commonwealth of Independent States, the organization of former Soviet states, in which Russia has many military installations and energy interests. It had also been using its energy prowess, particularly in terms of gas cut-offs, particularly to Lithuania, whose pipeline from Russia has been “under repair” since 2006.

Furthermore, two recent moves from the West have greatly angered Russia. Firstly, the declaration of independence by Kosovo in February 2008 and its support from the West was a major blow to Russian authority in the region. Russia has always had special ties to Serbia, since the Serbs are Slavic and culturally similar to the Russians (hence the start of World War I), so the fact that a massive part of an ally’s unilateral independence was accepted on a de facto basis by the global community was very worrisome, especially since Russia itself has many would-be breakaway republics. Furthermore, American plans to install missile interceptors in Poland and the Czech Republic, theoretically to defend against Iran, was seen as a major threat to Russia, which responded by threatening to put nuclear missiles on the border with NATO. It has since continued its harsh rhetoric.

Russian Policy towards the West under the Medvedev Administration

So far, policy under the Medvedev Administration has altered little from that of Putin on its relations with the West. As many Western observers do not think that power was completely transferred from Vladimir Putin to begin with, it is largely assumed that Russia will continue on the same policy track it has followed for the past ten years. Medvedev has proposed a massive legally binding security agreement stretching “from Vancouver to Vladivostok” composed of all European, North American, and former Soviet countries. Such an organization technically exists, known as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) but, created during the reign of Gorbachev, it has a view towards more “western” goals, like fair elections and human rights. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which is associated with the OSCE, was suspended by Putin in July of 2007 under demands that it be renegotiated since, in the eyes of Russia, the premises of the treaty became illegitimate with the expansion of NATO. Russia is also supporting the increased influence of its own organizations, including the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Eurasian Economic Union, the Russian-Belarusian Union, and the CIS in hopes that these will give it more power in the “near abroad”.

The most telling sign of the Medvedev Administration is the war in Georgia, conducted to defend the breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Both regions have been trying to gain independence since soon after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and have been in increased conflict with Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, who ran on a platform of creating a more unified country. The escalation of the conflict began in the summer of August 7, 2008, when Georgia mounted an aerial and ground attack on South Ossetia in response to military skirmishes between Georgian and South Ossetian soldiers, taking control of Tskhinvali, the Georgian capital. Russia responded with a military incursion into South Ossetia and an aerial bombardment of Georgia. It is unclear whether Russian troops entered South Ossetia before or after the Georgian incursion into the region, but Russia claims its involvement to protect its nationals and peacekeepers in the region. Fighting has also taken place in the region of Abkhazia.

Russia’s involvement has had a strong aspect of identity to it. More than half of the South Ossetian population has agreed to Russia’s offer of citizenship and Prime Minister Putin says that he feels it is unlikely that South Ossetia will ever become part of Georgia again. Two thirds of South Ossetia is ethnically Ossetian, like the autonomous republic of North Ossetia in Russia, with

which many would like to unify. South Ossetia has had *de facto* independence since the collapse of the USSR and Abkhazia declared its independence in 2008. Both are now recognized as independent countries by Russia.

Georgia has ties to NATO, which agreed in 2008 that it would eventually accept the former Soviet republic. The U.S. trains Georgian troops, who have been fighting in Iraq. In the face of fighting, the U.S. has called Russia's military campaign "an illegitimate, unilateral attempt to change the country's borders by force". The EU also condemned Russia's actions. This action has shown a major change in Russian policy, by which President Medvedev has promised to defend the "lives and dignity" of Russia's citizens regardless of the country in which they are located. He has also explicitly stated that, while he seeks friendship with the U.S. and EU, he would not accept a unipolar world with the U.S. as the sole power with global influence. He also states that Russia will maintain its interests in its sphere of influence.

Medvedev has chosen five principles on which he bases Russian foreign policy. These should be paramount in all of the committee's work:

1. Fundamental principles of international law are supreme
2. The world will be multipolar
3. Russia will not seek confrontation with other nations
4. Russia will protect its citizens wherever they are
5. Russia will develop ties in friendly regions

Russian Foreign Policy in the Balkans

Of particular interest should be Russian policies in the Balkans – a key area of dispute with the West over the past few decades. Russian policies focus on maintaining influence in the Balkans, as Russia does not have geographical access to the Mediterranean, but seeks to maintain a presence by holding a strong hand in Serbian politics and energy development.

Russia has aided Serbia and their land claims and stalled universal recognition of Kosovo's exact borders because it recognizes Serbian majority and cultural dominance in the overall region. In the past, Russia would aid Serbian politicians to use democratic means to control national institutions and they would reciprocate with mutually beneficial economic cooperation. With the fragmentation of the former Yugoslav republic, such wide reaching influence has been diminished. Russia seeks to now strengthen its bonds with ethnic Serbs in all regions, while promoting strong central leadership in Serbia and Serbian control over all areas with Serb majorities.

Serbia's foreign policy will increasingly oscillate between the perceived potential of strategic allegiance to

Russia and widespread support for EU accession, complicated by a determination to uphold its territorial integrity in light of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence and subsequent recognition by a number of EU member states. Russia's diplomatic support for the latter foreign policy objective will continue to exert an irrefutable influence over domestic politics in Serbia which, combined with this and other energy deals, guarantees a long-term Russian presence in the western Balkans.

Conclusion

Personalities and Alliances within Russian Politics

When researching your official, I would recommend that you examine specifically with whom they are allied. Russian politics is only loosely partisan, and are more accurately influenced by the sector (business, military, intelligence, Soviet politics) in which a given official started. Political parties, on the other hand, are defined mostly by whether they are in support or opposition of the government. Yet, at the same time, there are a very complex factions in Russian politics that must be considered.

According to most experts, there were two main factions in Putin's administration: the *siloviki*, liberal-technocrats. The liberal-technocrats are stronger believers in the free market, being mostly businessmen and economists. At the same time, though, they tend to support re-nationalization, provided it does not hurt foreign investment. On foreign policy, they tend to support more pragmatist and multipolar views of foreign policy, which tend to move Russia towards the West, while still retaining a degree of separation. They are generally more supportive of private influence in the state and a looser state structure.

The *siloviki*, on the other hand, tend to believe that the state is fundamental to society and should be strong. They seek to enhance security and defense and exert more control on the economy. They are seen as intensely patriotic, nationalist, more authoritarian, militaristic, imperialist, anti-Western, and xenophobic. In foreign policy, they look to reestablish Russian greatness in the world and establish greater influence in the "near abroad", or the former territories of the Russian Empire. They see the United States and NATO as a serious threat and would like to counter U.S. influence in their region.

During Yeltsin's reign in Russia, his "family", a group of oligarchs who grew fantastically wealthy by taking over formerly public industries, controlled most power. Yeltsin had assumed that insulating himself with allies would keep him in power, but this group was largely inept and corrupt, contributing to Russia's economic crisis. Under Putin, Yeltsin's "family" was purged from

government, replaced with members of the *siloviki*, the group defined as former members of the intelligence service, military, and police. While this group steadily gained power, in recent years Putin, probably fearing that any one group would threaten his power, began to balance his administration with liberal-technocrats.

In the 2008 election, Putin chose to select Dmitry Medvedev, a liberal-technocrat, over Sergei Ivanov, a *silovik*. Medvedev has since been attempting to bring more liberal-technocrats into government, but the conflict between these two factions is still as strong. In the area of national security, *siloviki* still hold a distinct majority. On the Security Council, *siloviki* include Putin, Patrushev, Nurgaliyev Serdyukov, Bortnikov, Gryzlov Lavrov, Naryshkin, and Fradkov. Liberal and technocrats include Medvedev, Shuvalov, and Mironov. Zubkov's position is debated.

Still, it is important not to see these two factions as two distinct or to separate. They are factions, not political parties, and thus have no structures. All intra-faction relations are just relations among powerful individuals. Also, they have internal divisions and disagreements. Furthermore, it seems that Messrs Putin and Medvedev would like to reconcile the two groups as much as possible. While it would probably be a good idea to keep this distinction in mind when dealing with other members of the Security Council, you should research your official to find their exact positions and placement in the immensely complex social-political structure that is the Russian government.

Research Suggestions:

It is highly recommended that all members of the Security Council of the Russian Federation write position papers on the two topics above. Position papers need not address every issue of every topic, but should cover all the questions for consideration at the end of each section. The position papers should also fundamentally consider the point of view of the member, including their position in government, their past experiences, and their ideological opinion. Position papers that merely echo the facts expressed in the topic guide will be of little use and will not be considered in high regard. Almost all of these officials have a long history in public service, so a simple internet search should at least bring up information on their records.

As for sources on the topics, I have focused intensely on news sources in drafting this topic paper, especially The Economist and the BBC. Other news sources are good as well, but I would recommend steering clear of Russian newspapers for general information on the topics, using them only for specific details. These papers

tend to be of poor quality, either written by the state or quite reminiscent of tabloids.

I have included below a few links that I feel are particularly useful. If you have any difficulties researching or any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at RFSC@Busun.net.

Bibliography:

Siloviki versus liberal-technocrats: The fight for Russia and its foreign policy

<http://www.diiis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports%202007/diisreport-2007-9.til%20web.pdf>

The Siloviki in Putin's Russia: Who They Are and What They Want

www.twq.com/07winter/docs/07winter_bremmer.pdf

Russia: The Security Council

http://www.russiansabroad.com/russian_history_294.html

On the Russian Federation Security Council

http://www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/docs/edict_1024.htm

Economist.com – Country Briefing: Russia

<http://www.economist.com/countries/russia/>

U.S. – Russia Relations

<http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/US-Russia.htm>

Library of Congress Country Studies: USSR and the Russian Federation

<http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/>

Putin and Russia's Middle Eastern Policy

<http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue2/jv10no2a1.html>

Russia Broad-bands Relations with Middle East

<http://www.boloji.com/analysis2/0187.htm>

Russia and Iran: Unfriendly friends

http://www.metimes.com/International/2008/01/02/russia_and_iran_unfriendly_friends/6525/

Russia's Soviet Past Still Haunts Relations with West

http://www.cfr.org/publication/13697/russias_soviet_past_still_haunts_relations_with_west.html

Economist.com – Survey: Russia

http://www.economist.com/surveys/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_NGGRNTS

Economist.com – Vague but sinister

http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=11837616

Q&A: Conflict in Georgia

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7549736.stm>